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There have been many attempts to explain the unreasonably high correlation between domestic saving and 
investment rates. The threshold testing procedure developed by Hansen (1999) provides a framework for testing 
the effects of key variables relating to capital mobility in conjunction with the saving-investment relationship. Ho 
(2003) first applied this method to the saving-investment puzzle controlling for thresholds in country size. 
Extending this model, this paper reports a number of significant thresholds effects for country- size, trade and 
financial openness measures, age dependency ratios and trade balances. After controlling for threshold effects 
the relationship between savings and investment is found to be statistically insignificant. Additionally, controlling 
for the thresholds effects in a dynamic model of the current account allows for direct comparison between the 
savings-investment coefficient and adjustments to a country’s external balance. 
 
I. Introduction 
Among a sample of OECD countries, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) (henceforth FH) find a high 
correlation between saving and investment rates. The authors test the relationship in a simple OLS 
framework, ( )i iiI Y S Yα β ε/ = + / + , where both variables are expressed relative to gross domestic 
product. FH interpret β  as the saving retention coefficient used to measure capital mobility. If β   is 
near one (zero) domestic saving is reinvested domestically and capital is immobile (mobile). 
Previous attempts to solve the FH puzzle have focused on a single time-series or across panel of 
homogenous countries. The panels have usually been grouped by income level, country size, or differing 
measures of trade openness. The groupings are selected exogenously without regard to an optimal 
selection procedure. This paper builds on these previous attempts by grouping countries by an 
observable characteristic that can be statistically tested for regime changing or threshold effects. The 
saving coefficients are significantly lower, and insignificant from zero after controlling for regime 
changes in financial openness, trade openness, country size, age dependency ratios, and trade balances. 
These results suggest saving and investment regressions can provide intuition behind capital mobility 
when controlling for thresholds using variables that are correlated with greater levels of capital mobility.  
Extending an error correction model first used by Jansen (1996) in the saving-investment literature 
makes the results directly relatable to a country’s current account balance. As the saving coefficient 
approaches zero, a change in the savings rate corresponds to a one for one change in the current account 
balance, domestic savings is being reinvested abroad. Furthermore, a reduction in the savings coefficient 
is correlated with a more persistent external balance. A change in the saving rate when the savings 
coefficient is near unity has no affect on a country’s current account balance. These results have 
important policy implications, especially for countries concerned about large current account deficits.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section (II) reviews the literature related to the FH puzzle, 
section (III) is devoted to explaining the econometric methodology, section (IV) explains the data and 
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results, and finally, section (V) concludes.  
II. Literature Review 
There has been a healthy debate questioning the approach FH used to test for capital mobility. 
Instead of using variables that measure the demand and supply of capital flows, FH test the relationship 
between domestic investment and saving rates which ignores interest rate differentials between 
countries. Their findings of no capital mobility were very surprising. The ending of Bretton Woods 
started a movement where countries adopted floating exchange rate regimes and removed capital 
controls to encourage international investment. The high correlation between saving and investment 
rates has been named one of the six puzzles within international macroeconomics by Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2000).  
The saving-investment puzzle has been extended to different samples by applying FH regressions to 
measure capital mobility.3 Researchers undertook confirmatory analysis by testing the relationship in 
settings for which capital is expected to be highly mobile. This included grouping countries by levels of 
trade openness and country-size. AmirKhalkhali and Dar (2007) find no systematic relationship between 
trade openness and capital mobility. Tobin (1983), Baxter (1993), and Ho (2003) control for country-
size.  Coakley et al. (1999), Kasuga (2004), Payne and Kumazawa (2006) find saving coefficients 
decrease for lower income countries. Bahmani-Oskooee and Chakrabarti (2005) control for openness 
and country size. Vamvakidis and Wacziarg (1998) control for openness and population growth. The 
above papers succeed in reducing the savings coefficient, but the coefficient remains positive and 
statistically significant.  
Recently the emphasis has shifted away from using saving and investment rates as a measure of 
capital mobility into modeling the adjustment behavior of a country’s current account imbalance. The 
current account is saving less investment, thus a strong correlation can be explained by a binding long-
run budget constraint (Sinn 1992, Coakley, et al. 1996, and Taylor 2002). In the long run a country 
cannot sustain growing current account imbalances. Eventually investment will decrease or saving will 
increase, both variables will converge to a sustainable current account balance. This will result in a high 
correlation between saving and investment rates. The long-run relationship has been modeled in an error 
correction framework (Jansen 1996), dynamic panel model (Coakley et al. 2004), panel cointegration 
tests (Banerjee and Zanghieri 2003), mean group estimators (Coakley 1996), and autoregressive 
distributive lag estimators (Corbin 2004).  
This paper provides two main contributions. First, using a procedure developed by Hansen (1999) 
this paper shows previous results are biased upward by ignoring multiple regime changes. Threshold 
effects are superior to other methods which exogenously divide the data into arbitrary groupings. 
Fouquau et al. (2007) use a panel smoothing threshold approach to test the saving-investment 
relationship. They test the relationship for 24 OECD countries using trade openness, country size, 
current account balance, and age dependency ratios. This paper focuses on the changing relationship 
across income levels and includes additional variables that are important for measuring capital mobility. 
Second, the saving coefficient has important policy implications as it measures a country’s ability to run 
a sustained current account imbalance. Extending the thresholds to a dynamic model of the current 
account allows for countries to better understand the speed of adjustments mechanism in relationship to 
the threshold break points.  
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III. Methodology 
Hansen (1999) provides the framework for testing if threshold effects are present. Within the 
literature it is common place to exogenously group countries by trade openness, financial openness, and 
country size. The threshold procedure will endogenously group countries together by finding the optimal 
break in a particular threshold variable. In addition to testing the standard variables both trade balances 
and age dependency ratios are also tested for threshold effects.  
3.1. Threshold Effects 
Following Hansen (1999), threshold effects are tested in a fixed-effect framework.4 The first step is 
to determine the appropriate number of thresholds (or regime switches) for each variable. The restricted 
model with no threshold effects is first estimated:  
 it i it iti s eα β= + +  (1) 
where 1i N= ,....., , 1t T= ,....., , ( )iti I GDP= / , and ( )its S GDP= / .  The next step in finding the optimal 
threshold value is to estimate an unrestricted regression that splits the data into regimes according to all 
possible threshold values. The optimal threshold value is selected as it minimizes the residual sum of 
squares in the following regression:  
 1 2( ) ( )it i it it it it iti s I q s I q eα β γ β γ= + ≤ + > +  (2) 
where itq  is a scalar threshold variable and ( )I ⋅  is the indicator function that takes a value of one when 
the threshold condition in the bracket is satisfied, zero otherwise. The error term is assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed with mean zero and finite variance 2σ .  
Instead of searching continuously over all possible threshold values the search is limited to the 
following quantiles {10%, 10.25%, 10.5%, 10.75%, 11%,..., 90%}. The bottom and top tenth percentiles 
are omitted during the grid search. Trimming the sample will remove the possibility of the results being 
driven by extreme outliers. After selecting the optimal threshold value it is important to determine if a 
threshold effect is statistically significant. The null hypothesis of no threshold effect is  
 0 1 2H β β: = .  (3) 
1 2β β=  is tested by a likelihood ratio test. Under the null hypothesis γ  is not identified thus Hansen 
suggests a bootstrapping procedure to simulate the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio test:  
 
0 1
1 2
ˆ( )S SF γ
σ
−
=  (4) 
where 2 1 1( 1) ˆ( )n T Sσ γ−= , 0S  are the sum of squared errors from the restricted regression and 1 ˆ( )S γ  are 
the sum of squared errors from the unrestricted regression. The null hypothesis of no threshold effect is 
rejected for large values of the likelihood ratio. Once the single threshold is estimated the process 
extends to models with double and triple threshold break points.  
To determine the second threshold break, the following model is estimated:  
 1 1 2 1 2 3 2( ) ( ) ( )it i it it it it it it iti s I q s I q s I q eα β γ β γ γ β γ= + ≤ + < ≤ + < +  (5) 
The second threshold is selected to minimize the joint sum of squares taking the first threshold as given. 
In order to ensure sufficiently large samples within each regime the second break point is restricted to be 
at least 10 percentile points larger or smaller than the first threshold value. 
                                                 
4
 The Hansen procedure is only applicable for fixed effects and does not extend to testing for random effects. The threshold 
estimation procedure is conducted using data in mean deviation form (within estimation) and it is not clear how to test for 
random effects.  
4 
 
Instead of testing for the existence of a threshold the likelihood ratio test for a second threshold 
effect is:  
 0 1 2 3H β β β: = = .  (6) 
Bai (1999) shows that the second threshold is asymptotically efficient opposed to the first threshold. Bai 
suggests a refinement estimator to fix the second threshold and then re-estimate the first threshold. If a 
second threshold effect is found statistically significant then a third threshold effect is estimated. A 
bootstrapping procedure is used to construct asymptotically valid p-values and critical values for the 
likelihood ratio test. One thousand bootstrap replications are used for each threshold variable.  A 
threshold break is deemed statistically significant if the p-value is less than 0.10.   
The next step is to estimate the saving and investment relationship for each threshold. Country fixed-
effects are implemented to control for exogenous shocks while time fixed-effects are used to control for 
business cycle effects. To control for income effects the data are split into different sub-samples by real 
GDP per capita: high income countries include those with average income levels greater than $9,000, 
middle income countries include countries with average real income between $3,000 and $9,000, and 
low income countries have an average real income less than $3,000.  
It is reasonable to suspect the threshold values will be different across income levels. For example, 
high income countries have more developed financial systems and offer similar rates of return on 
investments. The separation of saving and investment rates is likely to stem from domestic saving 
decisions pertaining to the demographics of a particular country. Middle income countries tend to be 
more risky and do not have the domestic resources for financing readily available. These countries are 
forced into using the global capital markets where variables such as trade openness, financial openness, 
and trade balances will play a large role in foreign investment decisions. Middle income countries tend 
to have high saving Asian economies mixed with Eastern European, Latin American, and some African 
economies. Finally, lower income countries have an entirely unique set of issues. These countries do not 
have developed financial systems and it is highly likely the threshold variables being tested in this paper 
will not offer a great insight into the explanation of the saving-investment relationship.  
 
3.2. Current Account 
 
A number of explanations have been given for the existent of a high correlation between saving and 
investment rates. A widely held explanation to the puzzle revolves around a country’s current account 
imbalance. Over time countries are restricted in their ability to run continual current account imbalances, 
this directly implies saving and investment rates will move together over time.5 A natural extension in 
the saving-investment literature was to test for cointegration between both variables. Jansen (1996) first 
incorporated an error correction model (ECM) to test the long-run saving-investment relationship. 
Unfortunately, Hansen’s procedure does not allow for lagged dependent variables. In order to 
circumvent this issue the thresholds parameters estimated in the previous section will be applied to 
Jansen’s ECM: 
 1 1( )t t t t ti s s iα β γ ε− −∆ = + ∆ + − +  (7) 
where i I Y= /  and s S Y= / . The ECM incorporates both short-run and long-run dynamics. In terms of 
the saving-investment relationship an ECM measures how annual changes in saving rates affect 
investment rates through β , and the speed of adjustment for a country’s current account imbalance, γ . 
Although incorrect, it is commonly assumed the error correction model can only be used if both saving 
and investment rates are non-stationary. The vector error correction model in equation (7) is a more 
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restricted version of a general autoregressive distributed lag model. The more general ADL(1,1) model 
does not require the variables to be non-stationary.6  
Using the error correction model and national accounting identities that show the current account is 
the difference between saving and investment, testing for thresholds in the saving-investment regression 
will explain changes in current account balances. By subtracting ts∆  from both sides the equation can be 
adjusted to show the long run relationship of the current account:  
 1 1( )t t t t t t ti s s s s iα β γ ε− −∆ − ∆ = + ∆ − ∆ + − + .  (8) 
Rearranging equation 8 and using the current account identity the long-run current account is:  
 1t t t tca ca sα γ θ ε−∆ = + + ∆ +%% %  (9) 
where / /tca CA Y S Y I Y= / = − , α α= −% , (1 )θ β= −% , and γ γ= −% . The speed of adjustment in the 
current account can be measured byγ . The half-life of current account imbalances, the time it takes for 
an imbalance to be cut in half, is equivalent to ln(.5) / ln(1 )γ+ % . Equation (9) allows for a direct 
comparison between the saving coefficients and the current account. If the saving coefficient β  equals 1 
a change in domestic saving rates leaves the current account unchanged. As the coefficient approaches 
zero a change in domestic saving is invested abroad causing an increase in the current account. The 
above model is an extension of Taylor (2002) which he suggests a basic AR(1) model to evaluate the 
speed at which the current account moves back to its equilibrium value. Taylor’s equation 
assumes 0θ = .  
IV. Data and Results 
National accounting data are from the Penn World Table 6.2 (Heston and Summers 2006). The data 
set is a balanced panel with 137 countries from 1970 through 2003. Saving rates are calculated as the 
residual of GDP less household consumption and government expenditures. Investment rates include 
private residential and gross fixed capital investment. Country size is measured as country i’s GDP 
relative to the mean of the world’s GDP for each year. Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports 
relative to GDP. Trade balance is exports less imports relative to GDP. Age dependency variables are 
from the World Bank and measure the percent of a country’s population between 0-14 and over 65. The 
financial openness variable is the sum of external assets and liabilities relative to GDP. These data are 
from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).7 Middle Eastern countries and Luxembourg are excluded.8 
The key threshold variables reported in this paper are trade and financial openness, country size, age 
dependency ratios, and trade balance. The saving coefficients should decrease for smaller, open 
countries.. This hypothesis is well documented in the literature (see Ho 2003, Baxter 1993, Bahmani-
Oskooee and Chakrabarti 2005, and Coakley 2004). Trade balances are directly related to the current 
account and capital inflows. Higher levels of trade imbalances correspond with greater current account 
imbalances which results in a lower saving and investment relationship. Countries with a large fraction 
of their population over 65 year should have higher savings coefficient, while countries with a large 
fraction of the population below 14 years should have lower savings coefficient. Countries with large 
numbers of retirees, domestic saving must finance retirement accounts, investment decisions will tend to 
focus on safer assets located at home. These countries will also have a greater stock of saving and will 
not need to resort to global capital markets for funding. Conversely, countries with a younger population 
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can make investment into more risky assets and seek out the highest global returns. Additionally, 
following the life-cycle hypothesis countries with higher measures of younger dependents will have 
fewer saving and be forced to borrow from global markets. (Herbertsson and Zoega 1999). 
4.1. Threshold Effects 
Table 1 provides the results testing for threshold effects and reports the p-values for all samples. As 
expected there are a number of statistically significant thresholds. Using the entire sample of countries 
trade openness and younger age dependency ratios have one threshold above the median quantile and at 
the median quantile, respectively. Two thresholds are found significant for financial openness, country-
size, and older age dependency ratios. Financial openness thresholds occur below the median and at the 
75th quantiles; country-size thresholds occur above the median and below the 25th quantiles; older age 
dependency ratios exhibit thresholds above the 75th and below the median quantiles. Trade balance has 
three significant thresholds above the 75th, and below the median and 25th quantitles, respectively.  
Low income countries only have two variables with significant thresholds. One threshold is found 
significant in financial openness and two thresholds are significant in trade balances. The threshold in 
financial openness occurs around the median value, whereas the threshold values in trade balances are 
occurring near the extreme minimum and maximum values.9  
 
 
Middle income countries have a number of significant thresholds. Two significant thresholds are 
found for trade openness at the median and 75th quantiles; financial openness below the 25th and above 
the 75th quantiles; and country size above the 75th and between the 25th and median quantiles. Three 
significant thresholds are found for trade balance above the 75th, at the 25th, and below the 25th quantiles; 
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younger age dependency ratios at the median and below the 25th quantiles; and older age dependency 
ratios above the 75th and below the 25th quantiles.  
High income countries have one significant threshold for trade openness at the median quantile; 
financial openness below the 25th quantile; and country size between the 25th and median quantiles. Two 
significant thresholds are found in trade balances above the 75th and below the 25th quantiles; and older 
age dependency ratios at the median and below the 25th quantiles. Younger age dependency ratios have 
three significant thresholds at the 25th and above the 75th quantile.  
 
 
In summary, low income countries have the fewest number of thresholds whereas middle income 
countries tend to have the most statistically significant thresholds. There are a few reasons that can 
explain these results. First, low income countries tend to have weak financial systems, large amounts of 
foreign aid, and poor governments that are not accounted for in the estimation procedure. These 
variables are more likely to explain the low correlation between saving and investment rates, not age 
dependency ratios, country-size, and openness measures. Middle income countries tend to span across 
diverse regions which include emerging Latin American, Asian, and Eastern European economies. 
These countries have attracted large amounts of foreign capital but have vastly different demographic 
factors (e.g. Asian economies are notably for high levels of capital mobility with high saving rates 
combined with large percentage of the population over 65). It is not surprising to find a number of 
different thresholds given the diverse countries in the sample. Finally, higher income countries are 
generally larger and more closed. The threshold variables have smaller variances which help to explain 
why fewer threshold breaks exist.  
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4.2. Regression Results 
 
Tables 3 through 6 present the results for the panel regressions controlling for each threshold break 
and report the threshold values, savings coefficients, and standard errors for regressions that include 
both time and country fixed-effects.  
Table 3 presents the results when all countries are tested for threshold effects. The saving coefficient 
without the presence of threshold effects is 0.153 and significant at the one-percent level. Countries that 
are relatively closed and have a large economy are considered the driving force behind high saving 
investment correlations. The most open countries have a savings coefficient of 0.063; meanwhile 
relatively closed countries have a much higher savings coefficient of 0.331. Country-size has a 
coefficient of 0.031 for the smaller countries in the 25th quantile and a coefficient of 0.597 for large 
countries above the 75th quantile. This confirms previous hypotheses that large, closed countries are the 
motivating cause behind high saving coefficients. The most financially open countries have a saving 
coefficient insignificant from zero, and the least open countries have a coefficient of 0.392. As expected 
the lowest saving coefficients correspond to the most financially open countries which implies these 
countries have the greatest degree of capital mobility.  
 
A country’s trade balance also provides intuition for the higher saving coefficients. Countries that 
have large trade surpluses or extremely large trade deficits have a savings coefficient that is statistically 
insignificant. Countries with a higher number of younger dependents have low saving coefficient of 
0.086, but the coefficient increases to 0.369 for countries with a higher percentage of older dependents.  
The results are different when the sample is split by income levels. Table 4 provides the results for 
low income countries. When pooling across low income countries the saving coefficient is 0.109 and 
statistically significant at the one-percent level. Only the results for which a threshold was found 
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statistically significant are reported. Countries that have a financial openness measure above the median 
value are consider open and have a savings coefficient of 0.005. Countries that do not run large trade 
imbalances have the largest savings coefficient of 0.217. The coefficients reported for low income 
countries are lower compared to middle and high income countries.  This is likely caused by a number 
of factors that have been previously mentioned.  
 
Table 5 presents the results for middle income countries. The savings coefficient is 0.245 and 
significant at the one-percent level. The coefficient is higher than both the entire sample and low income 
countries, but have more threshold effect that show periods of perfect capital mobility. The saving 
coefficients are insignificant for countries with values of trade openness, financial openness, trade 
balance, and younger age dependency ratios greater than the highest threshold values. Additionally, the 
coefficient is insignificant for countries with measures of country-size and older dependency ratios that 
are lower than the lowest threshold values. In other words, capital is perfectly mobile for small 
economics, countries with high measures of trade and financial openness, large trade imbalances, larger 
percentages of young dependents, and lower ratios of older dependents.  
Equally important, variables that exhibit multiple threshold breaks have saving coefficients that 
increase in magnitude. For example, as countries become more closed the saving coefficient increases 
from -0.022 for the most open economies to 0.563 for the most closed economies. A similar result exists 
as countries increase in size. Small economies have a savings coefficient of -0.005, medium economies 
0.528, and large economies display little evidence of perfect capital mobility with a savings coefficient 
of 0.712. A similar pattern is also present for age dependency ratios. These results confirm not only 
when countries have perfect capital mobility, but also what conditions restrict capital mobility and the 
degree to which capital flows are restricted.  
Table 6 presents the results for high income countries. The savings coefficient without threshold 
effects is 0.141 and significant at the one-percent level. The coefficients for all variables appear as 
expected. The saving coefficients are statistically insignificant from zero when countries are within the 
upper thresholds of trade openness, financial openness, trade balance, and the younger age dependency 
ratios and within the lower thresholds of country size, trade balance, and older age dependency ratios.  
These results are very similar to those found for middle income countries. Smal, open countries with 
high ratios of younger dependents, and low ratios of older dependents are likely to have greater 
measures of capital mobility.  
High income countries are able to rely on internal financing and not global capital markets. This is 
evident by saving coefficients approaching one for relatively large, closed economies with large 
percentages of older residents. The threshold value for trade openness is near the median value, which 
suggests all countries below the median value of trade openness have a savings coefficient near one, 
0.893. Countries in the upper half of the distribution for country size and upper third for population have 
saving coefficients of 0.708 and 0.728, respectively. Reiterating, high income countries have regimes of 
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perfect and imperfect capital mobility.  
 
 
In summary, the coefficients for trade openness, financial openness, country size, and age 
dependency ratios appear as expected in all samples. Small open economies have saving coefficients 
near zero while large closed countries have coefficients closer to unity. Countries with a larger 
percentage of younger dependents have perfect capital mobility; meanwhile as countries age capital 
mobility slows drastically. These results are amplified as income levels increase, providing more 
evidence economies are investing domestic savings into retirement accounts. Furthermore, countries 
with higher ratios of younger dependents will have lower levels of savings and are more likely to resort 
to external financing for domestic projects. As income levels increase not only do the result show cases 
for perfect capital mobility but also display evidence of imperfect capital mobility. For lower income 
countries appropriately modeling capital mobility should include added measures reflecting governance, 
property rights, stability, and foreign aid. 
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4.3. Current Account Dynamics 
Understanding the determinants of the saving and investment relationship is important as it pertains 
to measuring capital mobility and a country’s current account balance. Tables 7 through 10 present the 
results for equation (9). The results confirm the saving coefficient relates to a country’s ability to run 
persistent current account balances. From equation (10) Taylor (2002) argues β  is a summary statistic 
measuring the convergence speed of the current account. For high values of β  (in absolute value) the 
country experiences short lived current account imbalances and have difficulty smoothing external 
shocks. The error variance term (σ ) measures shocks to the current account. A large (small) variance 
suggests countries are more (less) vulnerable to external disturbance in the current account.  
   The results for the entire sample are presented in table 7. Comparing across tables 3 and 7 shows a 
strong correlation between a lower savings coefficient ( 0β =  or 1θ = ) and more persistent (small γ ), 
and volatile (highσ ) current account balances. When a country’s level of trade openness falls into the 
highest threshold the current account balance has a half-life of 10.1 years compared to a half-life of 5.0 
years when trade openness is in the lower threshold.10  Increased persistence in current account 
imbalances corresponds with lower saving coefficients. The saving coefficients in each of these regimes 
are 0.063 and 0.331, respectively. Financially open countries have a half-life of 5.7 years with a saving 
coefficient of 0.033, but financial closed countries have a half-life of 2.4 years with a saving coefficient 
of 0.392. Additionally, small countries are able to run current account balances with a half-life of 10.6 
years, but large countries experience a half-life of 2.3 years. The saving coefficient increases from 0.031 
for the smaller economics to 0.597 for larger economies. 
There is also a strong relationship between low saving coefficients and more volatile current account 
balances measured byσ . For all variables the lower saving coefficients correspond with greater current 
account volatility and higher persistence. Regimes where countries experience prolonged imbalances 
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(e.g. high measures of trade openness or small economies) are more prone to external shocks (σ  
increases).  
 
   The results presented in Tables 4 and 8 show a similar relationship between the saving coefficients 
and the statistics relating to the current account for low income countries. There is a strong correlation 
between lower saving coefficients and greater current account persistence. For example, high values of 
financial openness have a savings coefficient of 0.005 and a current account half-life of 10.3 years. 
Whereas low values of financial openness have a savings coefficient of 0.205 and a current account half-
life of 4.3 years. Countries that have trade balances in the highest threshold have the shortest current 
account half-life of 3.1 years. 
 
The results for middle income countries are presented in Tables 5 and 9. Middle income countries 
appear to have less persistent current account imbalances (high measures ofγ ) when compared to low 
and high income countries. Middle income countries are better suited to smooth external shocks.  
Countries that are relative open and have small economies are able to run persistent current account 
balances. Countries in the upper regime of trade openness experience a current account half-life of 8.7 
years, whereas closed economies experience external adjustment twice as fast. Meanwhile small 
economies have a current account half-life of 14.4 years compared to large economies with a half-life of 
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2.8 years. Following previous results there is strong correlation between low saving coefficients (high 
measure ofθ ) and higher measures ofσ , current account volatility.  
 
   Tables 6 and 10 provide the results for high income countries. High income countries have more 
persistent current account balances than middle income countries. This is a reasonable result given high 
income countries have relatively stable governments, growth, and credible monetary authorities. These 
factors will dampen the threat of current account reversals. The United States provides a good example 
for high income countries sustaining large current account imbalances. Comparing across regressions, 
the link between low saving coefficient and high current account persistence is also consistent with 
previous results. When trade openness, financial openness, and country-size have saving coefficients 
near zero the current account has a half-life of 8.9, 6.5, and 8.4 years, respectively.  
In summary, this section shows a lower saving coefficient corresponds with more persistence in 
current account imbalances. As capital mobility increases countries become more exposed to external 
shocks and face greater current account volatility. Thresholds corresponding with high levels of capital 
mobility were able to sustain current account imbalances with half-lives nearly twice as long as 
thresholds corresponding with lower levels of capital mobility.   
V. Conclusion 
   The FH Puzzle provides insight into capital mobility but can also be used to measure current 
account dynamics. Using Hansen’s (1999) approach measuring threshold effects in non-dynamic panels 
shows the estimates of saving coefficients are potentially biased from the failure to account for structural 
breaks or regime changing effects. Consistent with previous studies, low measures of trade openness and 
large countries are more likely to have high saving coefficients. The use of a measure to capture 
financial openness shows capital mobility increasing over time which is seen in a low saving coefficient 
14 
 
for more financially open countries. Additionally, testing the saving-investment relationship for age 
demographic variables shows middle and high income countries have a savings coefficient near zero for 
large fractions of their population under the age of 14 and small percentages above 65. Expanding the 
threshold results to a dynamic model of the current account shows countries with lower savings 
coefficients have more persistent current account imbalances, but have more exposure to external 
shocks.  
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